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Abstract
This article starts with a critical review of the current literature on the
Islamic radicalization and Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang, pointing out
that existing literature focuses too narrowly on certain aspects of the
Uighur insurgency, and is insufficient to explain the causal mechanism of
the insurgency and Islamic radicalization. Built upon historical evidence,
this article uses sociological analysis to explore the structural changes in
the Uighur community over the past decades, and demonstrates the
importance and effectiveness of social cohesion theory in identifying the
key causal variables which underlie and determine the course of Uighur
insurgency and Islamic radicalization. The last section of the article
offers policy implications on Islamic radicalization prevention at both
international and domestic levels, and on how to reduce the negative
impact of Islamic radicalism on national security and stability.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss3/4
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Social Cohesion and Islamic 
Radicalization: Implications from 
the Uighur Insurgency
By Tong Zhao
Introduction
Violent Islamic radicals are among the most dangerous enemies who pose 
a serious threat to international and domestic security. Nonetheless, very 
little in the literature that studies the root causes of Islamic radicalization 
explores the mechanism of radicalization on a macro-community level. 
The case of Uighur insurgency in China provides a unique opportunity to 
look critically into the issue of radicalization by employing social cohesion 
theory. Social cohesion theory not only explains the gradual radicalization 
of Uighur communities in Xinjiang, but also sheds light on the impact of 
declining social cohesion on non-Muslim communities in the same 
region. By taking into consideration the reciprocal interaction between 
radicalizing Muslim communities and non-Muslim Han Chinese, social 
cohesion theory uncovers the dynamics of Islamic radicalization and its 
impact on ethnic conflict.
The Uighur case has universal implications for policymakers and practi-
tioners who deal with Islamic radicalization. A systemic analysis of this 
case reveals the critical importance for maintaining and enhancing social 
cohesion in regions with significant Muslim populations. Western govern-
ments also have a lot to learn from the frustrating experience of the Chi-
nese Government in dealing with Islamic radicalization in Xinjiang. In 
addition, the Uighur case is relevant in the sense that it points out effec-
tive approaches for governments to check and contain anti-Muslim senti-
ment in a multi-ethnic society.
This article starts with a critical review of the current literature on the 
Islamic radicalization and Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang, pointing out 
that existing literature focuses too narrowly on certain aspects of the 
Uighur insurgency, and is insufficient to explain the causal mechanism of 
the insurgency and Islamic radicalization. Built upon historical evidence, 
this article uses sociological analysis to explore the structural changes in 
the Uighur community over the past decades, and demonstrates the 
importance and effectiveness of social cohesion theory in identifying the 
key causal variables which underlie and determine the course of Uighur 
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insurgency and Islamic radicalization. The last section of the article offers 
policy implications on Islamic radicalization prevention at both interna-
tional and domestic levels, and on how to reduce the negative impact of 
Islamic radicalism on national security and stability.
Root Cause of Uighur Insurgency: Current Schools 
of Thought
The Uighur insurgency existed before the creation of the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC) and has experienced a non-linear history of develop-
ment. The initial decades of the 1960s and 70s were relatively peaceful, 
but the Uighur insurgency re-emerged in the 1980s following the end of 
the Cultural Revolution, reached a peak in the late 1990s, lost some of its 
momentum in subsequent years, got revitalized during a series of terrorist 
attacks before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and finally culminated in the 
riot at Urumqi in July 2009. Since the beginning, violent Islamic radical-
ization in Xinjiang significantly contributed to the growth of Uighur 
insurgency. Most of the insurgent incidents were instigated and organized 
by Islamic radicals, and the development curve of the insurgency closely 
resembled the growth trend of Islamic radicalism in the region.
A variety of causal factors of the Uighur insurgency has been suggested. 
Government imposed restrictions on religious activities are believed to be 
one of the major reasons behind the insurgency.1 Economic inequality 
between the Han Chinese and the Uighurs in Xinjiang is also frequently 
mentioned as an important contributing factor.2 Other explanations 
include: cultural discrimination and oppression;3 immigration of Han 
Chinese into Xinjiang, which to some extent caused economic inequality 
between the two nations;4 political oppression (inadequate Uighur repre-
sentation in the government);5 external influence of radical Islamism;6 
growth of Uighur nationalism;7 and the government's tough measures 
against the insurgents (the so-called Strike Hard policy).8
All of these proposed factors are certainly helpful to understand the 
Uighur insurgency and Islamic radicalization in Xinjiang. However, they 
fail to provide a coherent explanation consistent with the historical evolu-
tion of the insurgency. For example, the frequently suggested correlation 
between religious restriction and insurgency is questionable. The most 
restrictive religious policies in Xinjiang were adopted during a series of 
country-wide political campaigns which began in the late 1950s and 
peaked in the 1970s. Particularly during the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to 1976, the government's religious policies were the most repressive 
since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Religious facilities were systemati-
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cally destroyed, and most religious practices were simply forbidden. Dur-
ing that period, however, Uighur insurgency was relatively rare.9 In 
contrast, after the end of the Cultural Revolution the Chinese Government 
had taken substantial steps to replace its ill-advised religious policies with 
more lenient and relaxed measures. By 1989, the number of mosques in 
Xinjiang had increased 5.8 times compared with a decade earlier to some 
20,000; by the end of the 1990s, that number had reached 23,000, and 
continued to grow.10 Nonetheless, the Uighur insurgency intensified in 
the early 1980s and continued to escalate.11 In general, the theory of reli-
gious repression does not fit well with the trend of the insurgency.
Furthermore, the current literature has focused exclusively on the growth 
of Uighur insurgency to the neglect of the emergence of Han Chinese 
antipathy against the Uighurs. The growing antagonism between these 
two groups contributed significantly to the ethnic conflict between the 
Han and the Uighurs during the Urumqi riot. It is necessary, therefore, to 
explore the evolution and root causes of the Han aversion to the Uighurs 
in China, which will shed light on the interactive dynamic between 
Islamic radicalization and its repercussion in a multi-ethnic society.
Social Cohesion: A New Perspective
Unlike the approaches taken by existing studies, the theory of social cohe-
sion starts with macro-community analysis, and most appropriately 
incorporates various contributing factors into a coherent mechanism that 
best explains and reflects the trend of Uighur insurgency and Islamic rad-
icalization in Xinjiang.
The definitions of social cohesion in sociological literature vary, but are 
closely interrelated.12 In this research, social cohesion generally refers to 
the bonds or "glue" that bring people together in society. Among the liter-
ature on social cohesion, the work led by Professor Ivan Turok at the Uni-
versity of Glasgow lays out the main components and dimensions of the 
concept, and thus is particularly helpful for this research to examine the 
evolution of social cohesion in Xinjiang.13
According to Turok, social cohesion is comprised of five main dimen-
sions: the first is material condition, which is the fundamental component 
of social cohesion, including particularly employment, income, health, 
education, and housing. The second basic element of social cohesion is so-
called passive social relationships, meaning social order, safety, and free-
dom from fear. The third dimension, active social relationships, refers to 
the positive interactions, exchanges, and networks between individuals 
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and communities. The fourth dimension is about the extent of social 
inclusion or integration of people into the mainstream institutions of civil 
society. The fifth and final dimension involves the level of fairness or dis-
parity regarding access to opportunities or material circumstances, such 
as income, health, or quality of life.14 Among the five dimensions of social 
cohesion, material condition is the foundation upon which the others 
rest.15
Through the lenses of the main dimensions of social cohesion, the follow-
ing sections of this article conduct a historical analysis of the evolution of 
Uighur insurgency in the context of societal structures of the Uighur com-
munity in Xinjiang, and seek to examine the relationship between social 
cohesion and Muslim insurgency and radicalization.
Social Cohesion and Uighur Insurgency (the early 
1950s–the late 1970s)
Two years after the liberation of Xinjiang, in 1952, the Chinese Central 
Government initiated land reform in rural areas of Xinjiang. During the 
reform, the government confiscated land from landlords and redistrib-
uted it among the population. They also started a country-wide program 
of "Agricultural Production Cooperatives" which encouraged peasants to 
pool their production resources (land and machinery) and farm jointly. 
The initial success of such programs encouraged the top leadership of the 
central government to go further in the direction of agricultural collec-
tiveness—People's Communes were widely promoted and established 
across China in 1958.
The framework of People's Communes served as the foundation for eco-
nomic collectiveness in Xinjiang from the late 1950s to the early 1980s. 
Communes that generally consisted of thousands of households were 
divided into production brigades and production teams. The communes 
exercised management and control of most agricultural resources such as 
labor and land, and were responsible for providing jobs to their mem-
bers.16 In such a system, every individual was relatively equal in terms of 
assets and economic benefits, and was dependent on the commune for 
employment, income, education, and to some extent even housing. The 
close connection between individuals and the commune served as the 
material foundation for social cohesion in Xinjiang during this period.
The communes also had important political functions. Communes 
operated as the main political institutions through which mass political 
campaigns were implemented, and close political and societal ties 
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between individuals and communes were established and strengthened in 
this process as well. During the 1950s, a number of political campaigns 
were launched across the country, such as the Three Antis Campaign 
(anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucracy), the Five Antis 
Campaign (anti-bribery, anti-theft of state property, anti-tax evasion, 
anti-cheating on contracts, and anti-stealing state economic information), 
and a series of Rectification Movements including the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign. Large scale political campaigns continued during the 1960s, 
including major anti-corruption campaigns such as the Four Clean-Ups 
Movement.17 During these campaigns, study and discussion groups were 
organized by units of production teams, production brigades, or 
communes, which further strengthened the social and political ties 
between the individuals and the collective units.
The international and regional environments also affected social cohesion 
in Xinjiang. Historically, Russia possessed a traditional sphere of influ-
ence in the northwest territories of China. After the Sino-Soviet relation-
ship soured in the late 1950s, the Soviet threat became prominent. From 
then on, the main theme of China's political campaigns became heavily 
focused on anti-Soviet revisionism. Because of Xinjiang's geographical 
proximity to the Soviet Union, the perception of Soviet threat was particu-
larly manifest in this region. The perception of serious external threat, as 
a result, overwhelmed potential internal divisions and significantly con-
tributed to social solidarity and cohesion in Xinjiang.
From the early 1950s to late 1970s, the economic foundation, social struc-
ture, political institutions, and international situation all contributed to a 
high degree of social cohesion in Xinjiang. During this period, Uighur 
insurgency was relatively rare and lacking in popular appeal, compared to 
the situation after the 1980s.18 Insurgent incidents during this time frame 
shared a number of common features. First, most riots before the 1980s 
grew and escalated slowly.19 The riot in Moyu County in 1954, for exam-
ple, took the instigators several years to plan and recruit, but in the end 
only 300 hundred people were recruited. In contrast, in the 4/9 Incident 
which took place in Aksu in 1980, more than 3000 people got together in 
a very short time without previous coordination. Second, most riots 
before the 1980s took place in remote mountainous areas where the natu-
ral conditions, though tough, made it easier for the insurgents to hide. On 
the contrary, the riots after the 1980s began to move into towns and 
major cities. During the late 1980s, for instance, at least three riots took 
place in Xinjiang's capital city Urumqi alone.20 Third, the instigators and 
participants of the insurgency before the 1980s were mainly middle aged 
or senior people who were mainly remnants from the previous generation 
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of separatists, whereas most of the organizers and participants of riots 
after the 1980s were young people, as were seen in the most recent 
Urumqi riot.
Declining Social Cohesion and Growing Uighur 
Insurgency (from the Early 1980s onward)
Collapse of Economic Foundation for Social Cohesion
After the end of the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping's taking over 
control of China, the policy of Reform and Open-up was adopted by the 
government, which drastically changed the economic structure in the 
country. Xinjiang was no exception.
With the introduction of a market economy and privatization of state-
owned companies and assets, the collective foundation of economy in 
Xinjiang collapsed. People's communes were disintegrated; collectively-
owned enterprises were overwhelmed by private ones and no longer 
offered reliable employment. The close economic ties between individuals 
and communes dissolved, but no viable substitute was established. As a 
result, the economic foundation for social cohesion no longer existed. 
Under the new market economy, individuals became economically inde-
pendent and were thereafter responsible for their own employment and 
economic benefits.
Economic liberalization also saw a freer flow of migrants across provincial 
boundaries. Many Han Chinese came to Xinjiang during the 1980s and 
1990s because of the rich resources and opportunities there. Today, eco-
nomic marketization, together with a growing number of the Han in Xin-
jiang, poses a serious problem for the Uighurs. Muslim culture in the 
Uighur community does not emphasize the importance of entrepreneur-
ship, and most Uighurs are based in rural areas where there are few 
chances of being exposed to the new economy.21 Moreover, language bar-
riers make it even more difficult for the Uighurs to be employed in private 
enterprises that are mostly owned and operated by the Han.22 In general, 
the Uighurs tend to be less adaptive to the market economy than the Han, 
and they have become economically isolated as a group. The Uighurs have 
been forced into an economic competition against the Han in which they 
have little advantage.
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Declining Social Ties
With the collapse of collective economy, the whole set of social mecha-
nisms that were associated with the economic structure vanished as well. 
No adequate substitutes for the social mechanisms were established to 
continue serving the purpose of incorporating individuals into main-
stream social institutions.
As economic relationships between individuals became competitive, 
social relationships between the economically advantaged and disadvan-
taged turned sour and tense. Both within and outside Xinjiang, widening 
economic gaps between the Han and the Uighurs led to social estrange-
ment. All over China, Uighurs who faced difficulty in integrating into local 
economies felt distanced from mainstream society, and their societal 
identification substantially diminished as a result. Indicators of declining 
social identification of the Uighurs include the growing numbers of social 
security incidents involving the Uighurs in major Chinese cities. Rampant 
Uighur thieves have caused serious social problems across the country, 
not only because of unprecedented crime frequency, but also because of 
the brutality in those violent incidents. Many Uighur peddlers have also 
been witnessed conducting coercive selling through violence or threat of 
violence.23 These incidents clearly point to an increasing level of psycho-
logical isolation and a declining level of social identification of the 
Uighurs in a Han-dominated society.
Increasing Islamic Puritanism and Radicalism
The economy of Xinjiang began to take off in the late 1980s, but a number 
of social problems followed. Corruption and social injustice contributed 
to the perception of social disparity in terms of access to opportunities 
and economic benefits, further undermining the degree of social cohesion 
in Xinjiang. Consequently, traditional moral standards are no longer 
observed as strictly as before, and many Uighurs today worry about the 
future of their younger generations, and blame the "evil society" for young 
people's misbehaviors.
Collectively, economic isolation, social marginalization, and the percep-
tion of social disparity and injustice have led to declining social cohesion. 
The primary consequence of this was an increasing thirst for orthodox 
and conservative Islam among the Uighurs who now find themselves 
greatly unsatisfied with and largely marginalized by the society and as a 
result turn to religion to seek relief, consolation, and hope. Hence, in 
recent decades, especially since the 1990s, the influence of Islamic puri-
tanism among the Uighurs has continued to grow.
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The trend of a renewal of orthodox and conservative Islamic practices is 
manifest in at least several aspects. In the mid to late 1990s, for example, 
the traditional form of mashrap gathering—a vehicle for regulating 
moral, religious, and social etiquette and forming male peer groups—was 
resurrected among Uighur communities in parts of Xinjiang. Some 
Uighurs have recently also begun to celebrate religious holidays that are 
traditionally celebrated in some Middle Eastern and Central Asian 
Muslim communities. Furthermore, the trend of returning to the mosque 
is probably the most salient manifestation of Islamic renewal. Since the 
1980s, the number of mosques in Xinjiang has grown several times.24 In 
Urumqi, the increasing number of worshippers has necessitated the 
replacement of small mosques with much larger ones. In addition, young 
people are now comprising a large and ever-growing proportion of the 
people going to the mosque, as opposed to two decades ago when almost 
only the elders went to the mosque.25 Moreover, renewed Islamic 
puritanism among the Uighur people has developed further into Islamic 
radicalization in some cases. With the number of Islamic radicals 
growing, more terrorist attacks and insurgent incidents were witnessed in 
Xinjiang.
Social Cohesion and Ethnic Conflict
Declining social cohesion promoted Muslim radicalization and insur-
gency, and also substantially contributed to uneasiness of the Han Chi-
nese in the region. Ultimately, these factors led to increasing Han 
resistance to perceived Muslim aggression perpetrated by the Uighurs.
Similar to Uighurs, Han individuals under current economic and social 
structures have also become largely independent in economic and social 
terms compared with the previous state controlled collective system. The 
government no longer exercised as much influence over individuals (both 
the Han and the Uighurs) as before, and its capacity to manage political 
campaigns and public propaganda has also been undermined by a low 
degree of social cohesion and weak connections between the public and 
the government.
As provocative incidents led to increasing antipathy of the Han toward the 
Uighurs, the Han no longer felt restrained by the reconciliatory ethnic 
policies of the government as they did before. They began to act on their 
own and to retaliate against perceived Uighur aggressiveness. The low 
degree of social cohesion has not only contributed to Uighur insurgency, 
but has also undermined tolerance and self-restraint of the Han, and 
weakened the government's capacity to sell and implement its reconcilia-
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tory policy among both the Uighur and the Han. As a consequence, the 
Urumqi riot in July 2009 quickly turned into an unprecedented violent 
ethnic conflict between the Uighurs and the Han, and the Chinese Gov-
ernment had to mobilize tens of thousands of armed police from other 
provinces to Xinjiang to stabilize the situation.26 
Implications Outside China
Social cohesion, as demonstrated in this article, most effectively explains 
the trend of Uighur insurgency and Islamic radicalization in Xinjiang, and 
incorporates various contributing factors into a coherent and manageable 
causal relationship. From the perspective of social cohesion, the following 
points need to be taken into consideration by policymakers to formulate 
their approaches of dealing with violent Islamic radicalization in both 
international and domestic arenas.
First and foremost, economic liberalization and political democratization 
programs in countries and regions plagued by Islamic radicalism should 
be pursued with extreme caution and thoughtfulness.
As Turok correctly pointed out, material and economic conditions are the 
fundamental component of social cohesion.27 In countries like Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, and Iraq, the overall social structures of most Muslim 
communities are built upon their traditional forms of economy, and any 
rude attempt to swiftly transform their traditional economy to a liberal 
market-oriented one would inadvertently undermine the economic foun-
dation of the social cohesion that has been playing a key role in sustaining 
those Muslim communities for decades and even centuries.
Liberal market economics, to a certain extent, is built upon individual 
responsibility and entrepreneurship, whereas the economic foundation of 
most traditional Muslim communities embraces a certain degree of col-
lectivism. The case of Uighur people in Xinjiang, for example, reveals the 
negative impact on social cohesion in their communities when the tradi-
tional social connections under a collective and local economic system 
were swiftly broken and no alternative measures were taken to establish a 
new set of economic and social ties under a liberal market system.
Most Muslim communities in Central Asia have no strong traditions of 
individual entrepreneurship, and are not very adaptive to or competitive 
in a market economy.28 When social cohesion declines as a result of rapid 
economic liberalization, violent Islamic radicalization is accelerated. Such 
problems were widely and repeatedly seen in Muslim communities across 
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the globe, from Uighur communities in Xinjiang to Muslim communities 
in Indonesia—the biggest Muslim country in the world—during Indone-
sia's economic transformation period in the 1990s.29 Therefore, efforts 
and resources need to be directed toward programs that aim to sustain 
and reinforce social cohesion in those Muslim communities. Economic 
liberalization should be carried out with great prudence and patience, and 
should be accompanied by measures aimed at building positive interper-
sonal connections and strengthening social cohesion.
The social cohesion theory reveals the false correlation between growth of 
wealth and de-radicalization. Policies that focus on growing the economy 
and increasing the wealth of Muslim communities do not necessarily pre-
vent radicalization from happening because economic growth does not 
always contribute positively to social cohesion. Because of declining social 
cohesion, the number of violent Islamic radicals in Xinjiang has increased 
even though their average income continues to rise. Policymakers should 
not make the same mistake as their Chinese counterparts did who tried to 
contain Islamic radicalization by focusing exclusively on reviving and 
growing local economies in troubled Muslim areas.
By the same token, policymakers need to be fully aware of unintended 
consequences that the process of political democratization could bring to 
a traditional Muslim society. If handled rashly, side effects of political 
democratization could result in societal split and disintegration, under-
mine social cohesion, and ultimately contribute to radicalization in Mus-
lim communities. The precarious political situations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq require policymakers to think carefully about their way of imple-
menting political democratization and to make greater efforts in sustain-
ing social cohesion during the democratization process.
Conclusion
The Uighur case illustrates the catastrophic consequences of a vicious 
cycle between violent Islamic radicalization and non-Muslim revenge in a 
Muslim-minority society. Conflicts along the lines of ethnicity and reli-
gion can cause much greater damage to a society than one-way radical 
Islamic violence, and thus require a government to take every effort to 
prevent Islamic radicalism from spreading hatred, provoking revenge, 
and splitting society. However, although the United States and many 
European Governments have launched programs to help Muslim immi-
grants adapt to western cultures and societies, not enough attention has 
been paid to encourage native residents to engage and develop positive 
interactions with Muslim immigrants. In recent decades, the numbers of 
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anti-Muslim incidents have risen quickly in several western countries, 
which is alarming and dangerous if the trend of escalation is not effec-
tively contained.30
The Chinese Government applies preferential policies towards the 
Uighurs in the hope of harmonious integration, but their approach in 
implementing the policy seems problematic and in fact further provokes 
antipathy among the Han Chinese against the Uighurs. What the Chinese 
Government has failed to do is also what the American and other Western 
Governments have so far largely ignored: initiatives and programs that 
focus on the majority non-Muslim residents to prevent anti-Muslim senti-
ment from spreading across society.
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